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1. Introduction
When a firm issues stocks to the public for the first time, this offering is an initial public offering
(IPO). For a firm with publicly issued shares, its follow-on issuance is a seasoned equity offering
(SEO). How about a firm that cross-lists its shares in two markets? Is the second listing an IPO,
as this firm is new in the second market, or an SEO, as the firm has already listed its shares in the
first market? In this study, we argue that the second offering is not an IPO, as the price history
of the first issued share arguably provides ample information in pricing the second issued share.
Neither is it an SEO, as the price of the first issued share is not a ready reference for the second
issued share across boarders and plays an anchoring role. In a nutshell, we propose that in pricing
the second issued share, the price of the first issued share, as a reference, serves both a beneficial
informational role and a possibly harmful anchoring role.
Prior literature shows that for a security traded in multiple markets, the price from one market,
as an important and conspicuous reference, helps to price the same security traded in other markets
(Eun and Sabherwal, 2003). However, the referred price may not be a perfect reference due to
market segmentation. Cross-listing normally involves cross-border listings, and the home market
is often mildly or even severely segmented from the foreign market (Foerster and Karolyi, 1999;
Chan et al., 2008), resulting in different rates of returns required by respective investors. There-
fore, even for the same security issued by the same firm, prices across borders are not directly
comparable. Consequently, the price from one market could be a biased and noisy reference for
the price of shares issued in another market. Behavioral biases such as the anchoring heuristic
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) might take effect in this occasion. We argue that for a firm that
cross-lists its shares in two markets, in pricing the second issued share, market participants have a
tendency to pay too much attention to the price of the first issued share at its face value and adjust
insufficiently for the difference in the required rates of returns in the two markets. As a result, the
offer price of the second issued share is biased toward the price of the first issued share.
We formalize the foregoing reasoning and develop a general model to describe the beneficial
informational role and the possibly harmful anchoring role played by the reference price. Many
2
studies have shown that the offer price in a typical IPO tends to be downward biased, and that
IPOs on average are underpriced (e.g. Loughran et al., 1994). This downward-biased offer price
is the prior. Then, we model the reference price revealed in another segmented market as a noisy
signal, which is biased by the degree of valuation difference between the two classes of shares. In
a rational Bayesian framework, investors can see through market segmentation and automatically
adjust for the bias in the signal. In this situation, the information contained in the reference helps
to reduce the underpricing. If market participants suffer from the anchoring bias, however, they
tend to rely on the biased signal at its face value and fail to adjust sufficiently for the valuation
difference. Consequently, the offer price is biased and the degree of underpricing is associated with
the valuation difference. Specifically, if the reference price is consistently downward biased, the
offer price is also downward biased due to the anchoring effect, resulting in greater underpricing.
Conversely, if the reference price is consistently upward biased, the anchoring effect produces
upward bias in the offer price, mitigating the degree of underpricing.
We utilize the IPO data of cross-listed Chinese firms to test the dual-role model empirically.
As of December 31, 2010, 80 Chinese firms at some point first issued foreign shares (either on
the Hong Kong exchange as H-shares or on the Chinese B-share market) and then issued Chinese
A-shares. At the A-share issuance, the trading price of the corresponding foreign share is available
as a reference and arguably plays a dual-role. This data set is appropriate for testing the dual-
role model for at least four reasons. First, the tight control on capital accounts by the Chinese
government exacerbates the segmentation between the Chinese domestic market and the foreign
market, resulting in substantial difference between the two markets. Second, domestic A-share
investors require a lower rate of return than foreign investors do (Fernald and Rogers, 2002, among
others). This translates to higher asset valuation in the A-share market than in the foreign market.
Thus, the foreign share price, when given too much weight, serves as a downside anchor that
biases the A-share offer price downward. For this specific sample, the anchoring effect is harmful
and results in greater underpricing, making the A-share first-day return an ideal proxy for the
anchoring bias. Third, the primary market arguably involves higher valuation uncertainty than the
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secondary market, which further highlights the importance of both the informational and anchoring
role played by the reference price. Finally, the Chinese securities market is still underdeveloped,
and Chinese investors are relatively unsophisticated and more vulnerable to cognitive biases. The
IPOs of Chinese cross-listed firms provide us with an ideal opportunity to examine the dual-role
model.
In the empirical tests, we use the offer price-to-earnings (PE) ratio to proxy for the anchored
estimate of the A-share valuation level, and use the aftermarket PE observed one month after the A-
share listing in the A-share market to proxy for the rational estimate. The foreign share PE ratio is
used to proxy for the reference valuation level. The valuation difference is proxied by the difference
in costs of equity capital, measured by the one-year buy-and-hold returns on respective foreign-
and A-shares. Cross-sectionally, we find two pieces of evidence supporting the informational
role played by the reference price. First, both the offer PE ratio and the aftermarket PE ratio are
significantly positively related to the foreign share PE. Second, we discover a significant relation
between the aftermarket PE and the A-share buy-and-hold returns. These two pieces of evidence
suggest that the aftermarket PE ratio incorporates information concerning firm-level cash flows
revealed by the foreign PE ratio, as well as information on the cost of capital in the A-share
market. In contrast, we fail to find a significant relation between the offer PE ratio and the A-share
buy-and-hold returns. This evidence suggests that in determining the A-share offer price, decision
makers incline to refer to the foreign share valuation only and fail to adjust the estimate sufficiently
for the valuation difference, consistent with the anchoring hypothesis.
We then examine the relation between the A-share underpricing and the valuation difference.
The A-share underpricing is proxied by the first-day return upon the A-share listing. We find that
after controlling for the adjustment made in the offering stage, the first-day return is still positively
associated with the valuation difference, supporting the anchoring and insufficient adjustment ar-
gument. Specifically, the first-day return has a significantly negative association with the A-share
buy-and-hold returns. It suggests that market participants tend to under-react to the variations in
the A-share’s cost of capital, but not to the foreign share’s cost of capital, lending further support
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to the anchoring argument.
Furthermore, consistent with the model predictions, we find that the positive association be-
tween the A-share underpricing and the valuation difference is weaker when market participants
are less likely to suffer from the anchoring bias, such as when the scale of the share issuance
is larger, when the state ownership is diluted to a greater extent after the new share issuance, or
when the flotation costs are lower. Besides, when the valuation uncertainty of A-shares is higher,
as indicated by a higher first-day turnover ratio, the positive association between the underpric-
ing and buy-and-hold returns is stronger. These results remain robust after we control for various
determinants of underpricing and in different model specifications.
Our study contributes to the international finance literature in that we are the first to advocate
the anchoring role played by the reference price in cross-listing. The proposed model and related
analysis are applicable to foreign firms that use domestic share price as a reference in pricing their
ADRs issued in the United States, or use the price of U.S. ADRs as a reference in pricing domestic
shares. We remind market participants that the reference price also plays an anchoring role, which
might work against its beneficial informational role and reduce pricing efficiency.
Besides, we conjecture that the anchoring bias in the financial market possibly influences man-
agerial decisions on the listing sequence. An optimal strategy is to first issue shares in a market
with a higher valuation level, and then issue shares in a market with a lower valuation level. By
taking advantage of investors’ anchoring bias, the issuer could boost its offer price and reduce un-
derpricing in the second issuance. As the average valuation level is higher in the A-share market
than in the H-share market, the first-A-then-H listing sequence could work to reduce the H-share
underpricing, due to the anchoring propensity of investors in the H-share market. For instance,
Minsheng Bank listed its A-shares in December 2000 and H-shares in November 2009. The first-
day return on its H-share listing was -11.65%, and our anchoring argument could at least partially
explain this phenomenon.
Our study also adds to the behavioral finance studies on the anchoring effect (Shafir et al.,
1997; George and Hwang, 2004; Campbell and Sharpe, 2009; Cen et al., 2012; Chang et al., 2011,
5
among others) by providing an additional piece of evidence from the primary market. We develop
a model to describe one possible channel through which the anchoring bias might exert its influ-
ence. A generalization of this framework has the potential to explain the anchoring effect in other
scenarios as well.
This study contributes to the extensive IPO literature. We take a behavioral standpoint and doc-
ument an additional factor that may affect the degree of underpricing. Our anchoring argument is
compatible with those of Loughran and Ritter (2002) and Krigman et al. (1999). Purnanandam and Swaminathan
(2004) emphasize that the valuation levels of comparable firms are reasonable benchmarks for
pricing new shares. This study, however, specifically investigates market participants’ “misuse” of
references resulting from their failure to adjust the estimate sufficiently for the underlying differ-
ences.
Finally, this study has important practical implications for Chinese economic reform. First,
although Chinese financial market has experienced a rapid expansion, it is still relatively under-
developed. Many investors, issuers, and even regulators fail to understand the barriers between
domestic and foreign markets, and thus tend to suffer from strong anchoring bias. Our study could
help these market participants to understand market segmentation better and improve pricing ef-
ficiency. Second, our study has general applications beyond the A-H cross-listing. Many foreign
firms (e.g., HSBC) and giant Chinese firms with red-chip shares (e.g. China Mobile, China Off-
shore Oil, and China Netcom) have expressed strong interests in issuing A-shares. Although these
foreign entities are currently proscribed from issuing shares in the mainland market under Chinese
Security Law and listing rules, we believe that changes in the regulation could be expected in the
foreseeable future to pave the way for the development of Shanghai International Board. Our an-
choring argument is applicable in such a broader cross-listing context. Third, policy-makers have
been discussing the application of a so-called “arbitrage mechanism” to eliminate the price dif-
ference between A-shares and their corresponding H-shares. However, no such a mechanism can
effectively “arbitrage” away the difference if the Chinese financial market is not fully liberalized.
Fourth, Chinese firms such as the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) and China
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CITIC bank implemented an “A+H” IPO mechanism by issuing A- and H-shares simultaneously
at the same price in 2006 and 2007, respectively. We argue that such a “A+H” design is inferior,
as issuers could have raised more funds by offering different prices in the two markets. Some
other firms issued A- and H-share in a synchronized issuance (e.g., China Southern Locomotive,
Metallurgical Corporation of China, and New China Life Insurance in 2007, 2009 and 2011, re-
spectively), in which the offer price of the A-share is designed to be no higher than that of the
corresponding H-share. Such a design dampens the A-share pricing efficiency to a greater extent,
as the lower cost of capital in the A-share market suggests that the A-shares should be traded at a
premium relative to their H-share counterparts.
The rest of this article goes as follows. Section 2 reviews related streams of literature. Section
3 develops a theoretical model and testable hypotheses. Section 4 introduces the data sources and
presents our baseline empirical results, and Section 5 shows the results of robustness tests. Section
6 concludes.
2. Literature review
2.1. Cross-listings
The global capital market has experienced accelerating cross-border capital flows over the past
twenty years. At the same time, cross-listing has become an important financing strategy for
companies. Firms that list shares on multiple exchanges gain access to capital sources abroad with
lower costs of capital (Errunza and Miller, 2000; Foerster and Karolyi, 1999). Existing studies
show that the benefits obtained from cross-listing usually outweigh the additional costs incurred.
Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) report a sample of 2,955 foreign firms listed in the U.S. market
by 2003 via ordinary listings, ADRs, OTC listings, or Rule 144a private placements. If a firm issues
domestic shares before issuing shares in the U.S. market, its U.S. listing resembles a seasoned
equity offering (SEO). When a firm sequentially issues shares in multiple markets, existing shares
undoubtedly become references for pricing the new shares.
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2.2. The informational role by the reference price
Hayek (1945) states that “we must look at the price system as such a mechanism for communi-
cating information if we want to understand its real function ... by a kind of symbol, only the most
essential information is passed on...” (p. 527). This proposition suggests that the price (symbol)
is a concise and useful reference. This intuitive argument is widely supported in the literature.
For example, Eun and Sabherwal (2003) find that for a firm cross-listed on the U.S. and Canadian
exchanges, its stock prices in two markets mutual-adjust to each other, indicating that information
flows across borders. The evidence suggests that for a cross-listed firm, the share price in one
market, as a concise and useful reference that conveys important information, helps to promote the
pricing efficiency in another market.
2.3. Market segmentation
Cross-listing normally involves cross-border listings, and the home market is often mildly or
even severely segmented from the foreign market. For cross-listed securities, although the foreign
and domestic shares are entitled to identical cash flow rights and voting rights, there are still sub-
stantial differences between them. The legal environment, government regulations, and the degree
of financial market development may differ at the institutional level. Besides, there are differences
in preferences, risk attitudes, sentiment, and degrees of sophistication at the individual investor’s
level. As a result, shares with identical fundamental business and financial risks, but listed in two
different markets, may have different required rates of returns, and thus differ in their costs of
capital. In the remainder of this article, we use the cost of capital and the required rate of return
interchangeably.
Chinese domestic investors require lower rates of returns than foreign investors as a result of
the severe market segmentation (Fernald and Rogers, 2002). The Chinese B-share market and the
Hong Kong market are integrated with the global market and have few barriers to the capital flows.1
1The B-share market differs from the H-share market in several aspects. First, the B-share market was established
along with the A-share market in the early 1990s, and it is regulated and operated by Chinese government agencies.
In comparison, the Hong Kong market is independent from the Chinese government. Second, the B-share market is
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The cost of capital of foreign shares is thus determined by the risk and time-value compensation
required by average international investors. In comparison, the Chinese securities market is only
semi-liberalized, and the most pronounced barriers are the tight control on inward and outward
capital accounts. The excessive demand for securities relative to the limited supply in the Chinese
stock market pushes domestic Chinese investors to require relatively lower returns on A-share
investments.2
In addition to market segmentation, existing literature shows that the exposure to different
market factors (Wang and Jiang, 2004), higher information asymmetry faced by foreign investors
(Chan et al., 2008), weaker corporate governance in China (Cai et al., 2011), RMB appreciation
and the sentiment (Arquette et al., 2008) also contribute to the lower costs of capital required by
Chinese domestic investors compared to foreign investors and lead to the A-share premium relative
to H-share. However, the A-H premium drops substantially in recent years, and from 2010 to 2012,
A-shares were sometimes traded at a discount to H-shares at the aggregate level. Echoing Cai et al.
(2011), we argue that Chinese market liberalization helps to reduce the H-share discount, but the
excess demand for securities in the Chinese market will result in the foreign share discount in the
small with only 114 shares thinly traded, and stock prices are often volatile. In contrast, 1,413 firms are listed on the
Hong Kong Security Exchange (Main Board and Growth Enterprise Market) by December 2010, and among them
592 firms are from China (including 163 H-shares, 102 red-chips, and 327 non-H-Share mainland private enterprises),
contributing to 56.6% of the capitalization of Hong Kong securities market. (Sources: Hong Kong Exchanges and
Clearing Limited.) H-shares are issued by companies incorporated in mainland China but are traded on the Hong
Kong Stock Exchange. In comparison, Red-chip stocks are issued by companies that have mainland China background
and are incorporated outside mainland China and listed in Hong Kong. Finally, since February 19, 2001 Chinese
domestic investors have been able to trade B-shares as well, although the A- and B-shares of the same firm are still not
interchangeable.
2In Chinese A-share market, since the domestic capital cannot freely flow into foreign financial markets at a rea-
sonably low cost, domestic investors cannot conveniently seek better investment opportunities in overseas markets.
Chinese investors thus have very limited investment opportunities and the A-share securities market is one of the few
possibilities, especially when the government suppresses the deposit interest rate to a quite low level (sometimes even
lower than the inflation rate). In the meantime, as international investors are seeking global risk diversification oppor-
tunities, a total amount of 24.5 billion U.S. dollar foreign capital has flowed into the A-share market through Qualified
Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) mechanism (March 3, 2012, reported by State Administration of Foreign Ex-
change, China. http://www.safe.gov.cn). These factors contribute to strong demand for securities in the Chinese
market, while the supply is rather limited. In the 1990s, limited issuance quotas restricted the scale of the stock mar-
ket, and the procedures for obtaining the listing approval or to verify the eligibility for qualification were complex and
time-consuming. No foreign firms were able to list shares in Chinese exchanges as of March 2012, and some Chinese
firms listed shares abroad, further limiting the supply of securities. The Qualified Domestic Institutional Investors
(QDII) only partially helps to solve the over-demand problem. We examine the impact of QDII in details in Section
5.4.
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long run. As it is difficult to find an uncontroversial proxy for firm’s cost of equity capital, we do
not select risk factors or estimate factor loadings. Instead, we use the terminology “difference in
costs of capital” to refer to the overall pricing difference between cross-listed shares, which have
exactly the same fundamentals.
The market-average PE ratio represents the valuation level in each market. As an illustration,
we calculate the median PE ratio based on all stocks listed on the A-share, B-share, and Hong
Kong markets, respectively. Figure 1 plots the median PE ratio of each market over time. The
median PE ratio in the A-share market is much higher than that in the B-share or Hong Kong
market during most of the time. On the condition that the average fundamentals of listed firms in
respective markets are largely the same, the higher PE ratio in the A-share market supports our
argument that investors in the A-share market require lower rates of returns than foreign investors.
2.4. The anchoring bias
In pricing assets across segmented markets, the anchoring effect is a behavioral bias that may
possibly reduce the pricing efficiency. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) define anchoring as follows:
“in many situations, people make estimates by starting from an initial value that is adjusted to
yield the final answer ... adjustments are typically insufficient. That is, different starting points
yield different estimates, which are biased toward the initial values. We call this phenomenon
anchoring.” (p. 1128) Tversky and Kahneman (1974) assert that the more ambiguous the value
of a commodity, the more likely that the anchoring bias will take effect in the determination of
its price. Chapman and Johnson (2002) suggest that the monetary incentives help to reduce the
anchoring bias.
Past studies examine the anchoring effect in various contexts. Shafir et al. (1997) postulate
that anchoring on the nominal evaluation gives rise to the money illusion. Campbell and Sharpe
(2009) find that consensus forecasts of monthly economic releases are biased toward the values of
previous months’ data releases, and market participants anticipate that anchoring bias. Cen et al.
(2012) find that analyst forecasts are cross-sectionally anchored to the industry median, and such
forecast errors predict stock returns. George and Hwang (2004) argue that traders might use the
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52-week high as an “anchor” when assessing the stock price change implied by new information.
Chang et al. (2011) use the anchoring effect to explain the ex-day abnormal returns for stock dis-
tributions. Our study provides an additional piece of evidence of anchoring in the cross-listing
context. Specifically, we are the first to propose a possible channel through which the anchoring
bias takes effect: as the signal is consistently biased, putting too much weight on the signal and
thus failing to adjust the estimate sufficiently for the underlying difference effectively build the
anchoring bias into the estimate. Our model is applicable to other anchoring-related scenarios.
2.5. IPO underpricing
Our study contributes to the extensive IPO literature by investigating the influence of the an-
choring bias. IPO Underpricing is a persistent worldwide phenomenon and attracts attention from
both academia and practitioners. The updated statistics in Loughran et al. (1994) show an aver-
age 18% of IPO underpricing in the U.S. market from 1960 to 2006. The degree of underpricing
varies widely across the global equity markets, and the Chinese stock market is among one of those
with the highest levels of IPO underpricing. Chen et al. (2008), among others, report an average
underpricing of 165% for 1,394 IPOs in China between 1990 and 2005.
Researchers have investigated the origin of IPO underpricing extensively over the past decades.
Many existing studies offer explanations based on incomplete or asymmetric information argu-
ments, while some others seek alternative explanations from behavioral perspectives (e.g., Loughran and Ritter,
2002). These theories face great challenges in explaining the tremendous profits in the Chinese pri-
mary market. Tian (2011) argues that the government intervenes the IPO pricing process through
setting a pricing cap and controls the IPO supply, contributing to extremely high underpricing.
Chen et al. (2008) maintain that the Chinese bureaus deliberately underprice the IPOs of state-
owned enterprises to obtain a higher probability of being promoted. Fan et al. (2007) argue that
non-politically-connected CEOs underprice shares to signal their credible intention of relinquish-
ing the control of their firms. In this study, we propose the anchoring effect as an alternative
explanation applicable to cross-listed firms.
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3. Model and hypotheses
In this section, we develop a model to illustrate the informational and anchoring role played by
the reference price.
3.1. The informational role
In a general case, a security’s true value θ is assumed to follow a normal distribution: θ ∼
N (θ¯, σ2θ). A public noisy signal s is then observed: s = θ + ǫ , where ǫ is a white noise: ǫ ∼
N (0, σ2ǫ ) and ǫ is orthogonal to θ. The conditional expectation of θ by rational participants is
denoted as ER. According to the orthogonality principle,
ER =
σ2ǫ
σ2θ + σ
2
ǫ
θ¯ +
σ2θ
σ2θ + σ
2
ǫ
s. (1)
This conditional estimate ER is a weighted average of the prior θ¯ and the signal s. As the weights
fall within [0,1], ER lies between θ¯ and s inclusive. If s > θ¯, the conditional estimate ER is higher
than the prior θ¯ and s is thus called a positive signal. Conversely, if s < θ¯, ER is lower than θ¯ and
s is called a negative signal.
3.1.1. IPO: A wrong prior
In pricing the second issued share in cross-listing, we assume that market participants first
collect all available domestic information and form a prior θ¯′, and then observe the signal s that is
the price of the first issued share in another market. IPO underpricing literature suggests that the
offer price θ¯′ tends to be lower than the true value θ¯. The initial underpricing is
θ − θ¯′ ∼ N (θ¯ − θ¯′, σ2θ). (2)
Participants then observe the reference price s. Given the wrong prior θ¯′ and the informative signal
s, the rational conditional estimate is
ER =
σ2ǫ
σ2θ + σ
2
ǫ
θ¯′ +
σ2θ
σ2θ + σ
2
ǫ
s, (3)
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where ER is a weighted average of the signal s and the wrong prior θ¯′. Although the belief in the
mean prior is wrong, people are rational in processing the signal s to form the conditional estimate.
3.1.2. A consistently biased signal
The signal s needs more elaboration. In the empirical tests, we utilize a special sample of
cross-listed Chinese firms that first issue foreign B- or H-shares, and then domestic A-shares. In
pricing the second issued A-shares, the price of the first issued foreign share is a natural reference.
However, it is common knowledge that the A-share tends to be traded at a premium relative to its
corresponding B-/H-share price. Consequently, the observed foreign share price at face value is a
consistently downward-biased signal. This reference price at face value is
s′ = s− c = θ − c+ ǫ, (4)
where c is a constant, representing the valuation difference between shares cross-listed in two
segmented markets. In the case of a first-foreign-then-A listing sequence, in pricing the second
issued A-share, c > 0.
The rational estimate of the second issued share is accordingly
ER =
σ2ǫ
σ2θ + σ
2
ǫ
θ¯′ +
σ2θ
σ2θ + σ
2
ǫ
(s′ + c) =
σ2ǫ
σ2θ + σ
2
ǫ
θ¯′ +
σ2θ
σ2θ + σ
2
ǫ
s. (5)
We find that c, the bias in the prior, is automatically corrected in the Bayesian framework such that
Eq. (5) has the same presentation as Eq. (3). The true information contained in the reference is
actually s = s′ + c, not its face value s′.
After observing the reference price s′, participants update the prior θ¯′ toER, and the conditional
underpricing is accordingly
θ − ER =
σ2ǫ
σ2θ + σ
2
ǫ
(θ − θ¯′)−
σ2θ
σ2θ + σ
2
ǫ
ǫ. (6)
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The expected underpricing is
E[θ − ER] =
σ2ǫ
σ2θ + σ
2
ǫ
(θ¯ − θ¯′) <= E[θ − θ¯′] = θ¯ − θ¯′. (7)
The variance of this underpricing is
V ar[θ −ER] =
σ2ǫ
σ2θ + σ
2
ǫ
σ2θ <= V ar[θ − θ¯
′] = σ2θ . (8)
Eq. (7) and (8) reveal the informational role played by the reference price. After participants
observe the reference s′ and correctly update the estimation, the conditional underpricing is on
average reduced with a smaller variance. The average conditional underpricing is only a fraction
of the average unconditional underpricing, and the variance of the conditional underpricing is
the same fraction of the variance of unconditional underpricing. This fraction σ2ǫ/(σ2θ + σ2ǫ ) is
determined by the valuation uncertainty of the second-issued share itself and by the precision of
the signal s′. As θ is more uncertain (higher σ2θ ) and/or the signal s′ is more precise (lower σ2ǫ ), the
fraction is smaller, indicating a greater benefit brought by the signal s′. This model prediction is
consistent with the intuition that ignoring the information cost, information production is beneficial
in reducing the expected IPO underpricing.
3.2. The anchoring role
We rewrite Eq. (3) or (5) as
ER = s−
σ2ǫ
σ2θ + σ
2
ǫ
(s− θ¯′). (9)
The above equation shows an adjustment framework frequently used in reality. As predicted by the
anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic, people tend to choose a starting point and then make direc-
tional adjustment. Rational participants will choose the true signal s as the starting point and then
make adjustment. The adjustment is downward if s > θ¯′ and upward if s < θ¯′. The magnitude of
adjustment is the proportion σ2ǫ/(σ2θ + σ2ǫ ) of the distance |s − θ¯′|. Note that rational participants
start with the true signal s = s′ + c, not the face value s′. In addition, the direction and magnitude
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of the adjustment is determined by the comparing s (not s′) with θ¯′.
3.2.1. Anchoring: Insufficient adjustment
Predicted by the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic, participants incline to choose an evi-
dent/seemingly important value as the starting point, which tends to be an anchor, and then adjust
the estimate insufficiently toward the final estimate. As the true signal s is unobservable and hard
to obtain, we assume that participants choose the face value s′ as the starting point. Participants
thus incline to adopt the following pricing strategy
ER = s
′ −
σ2ǫ
σ2θ + σ
2
ǫ
(s′ − θ¯′) +
σ2θ
σ2θ + σ
2
ǫ
c. (10)
Eq. (10) is equivalent to Eq. (9). It shows that if participants start with the face value s′ instead of
the true value s, they should adjust for an additional component of σ2θ/(σ2θ+σ2ǫ )c to get the rational
estimate.
Predicted by the anchoring heuristic, however, the adjustment toward the final estimate is usu-
ally insufficient. There are alternative ways to model this insufficient adjustment: participants may
underestimate the fraction σ2ǫ /(σ2θ + σ2ǫ ), the distance s′ − θ¯′, or/and the bias c. Specific to the
cross-listing scenario, we simply assume that participants underestimate c. We use a coefficient
γ ∈ [0, 1] to measure the anchoring propensity, with a lower γ representing stronger anchoring
propensity. The anchored estimate, denoted as EA, is
EA = s
′ −
σ2ǫ
σ2θ + σ
2
ǫ
(s′ − θ¯′) +
σ2θ
σ2θ + σ
2
ǫ
γc =
σ2ǫ
σ2θ + σ
2
ǫ
θ¯′ +
σ2θ
σ2θ + σ
2
ǫ
(s′ + γc). (11)
In terms of unobservable s, the equation is rearranged to
EA =
σ2ǫ
σ2θ + σ
2
ǫ
θ¯′ +
σ2θ
σ2θ + σ
2
ǫ
s−
σ2θ
σ2θ + σ
2
ǫ
(1− γ)c. (12)
If γ = 1, participants suffer from no anchoring bias and the anchored estimate EA converges to the
rational estimateER as in Eq. (5). As γ is smaller, the anchoring bias becomes severer. Concerning
a typical Chinese firm that first issues foreign and then domestic A-shares, c > 0 and EA < ER.
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The anchoring bias thus incorporates a downward bias into the A-share offer price and adds to
A-share underpricing.
3.2.2. Underpricing for the anchored estimate
The underpricing of the anchored estimate is
θ − EA =
σ2ǫ
σ2θ + σ
2
ǫ
(θ − θ¯′)−
σ2θ
σ2θ + σ
2
ǫ
ǫ+
σ2θ
σ2θ + σ
2
ǫ
(1− γ)c. (13)
The expected underpricing is
E[θ − EA] =
σ2ǫ
σ2θ + σ
2
ǫ
(θ¯ − θ¯′) +
σ2θ
σ2θ + σ
2
ǫ
(1− γ)c. (14)
A comparison between Eq. (14) and Eq. (7) reveals that for Chinese firms first issuing foreign and
then A-shares, c > 0 and E[θ − EA] > E[θ − ER]. It suggests that the foreign share price plays
a harmful anchoring role as it further exacerbates the A-share underpricing. The anchoring effect
could also exert a beneficial influence in certain cases. For instance, if Chinese firms first issue
domestic A-shares and then foreign shares, c < 0 and the anchoring role played by the first-issued
A-share price actually helps to reduce the underpricing of the second-issued foreign share.
The variance of the anchored underpricing is
V ar[θ −EA] =
σ2ǫ
σ2θ + σ
2
ǫ
σ2θ = V ar[θ − ER] < V ar[θ − θ¯
′]. (15)
It follows that although anchoring may affect the expected underpricing, it does not produce addi-
tional volatility in underpricing. The rational is that although the anchoring bias produces direc-
tional bias in the conditional estimate, this bias is consistently upward or downward such that the
volatility of underpricing does not increase. This is consistent with the intuition that with a readily
observable foreign share price as a reference, the degree of A-share underpricing of cross-listed
firms is more predictable than that of firms without such a reference. It attests to the beneficial
informational role from a different perspective.
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3.3. Dual-role played by the reference price
We model the net effect brought by the existence of a foreign share price by comparing the
anchored underpricing with the unconditional underpricing:
(θ − EA)− (θ − θ¯
′) =
σ2θ
σ2θ + σ
2
ǫ
(1− γ)c−
σ2θ
σ2θ + σ
2
ǫ
ǫ−
σ2θ
σ2θ + σ
2
ǫ
(θ¯ − θ¯′). (16)
The first component on the right hand side of Eq. (16) represents the anchoring role played by
the foreign share price. For Chinese firms first issuing A- and then foreign shares, c > 0 and the
anchoring effect adds to the underpricing in the A-share issuance. The second and third compo-
nents represent the informational role played by the foreign share price. The second component
shows the informational role conditioning on the sign of the realized signal s. If the price of the
first issued foreign share, after adjusting for the valuation difference between the two segmented
markets, is higher than the true value of the second issued A-share, the realized ǫ is positive. The
reference price then works to raise the offer price and reduce underpricing. Conversely, if the real-
ized ǫ is negative, the reference price depresses the offer price and further exacerbates underpricing.
The third component shows the unconditional contribution of the signal: regardless of the sign of
the signal, the presence of signal itself helps to reduce the underpricing proportionally. Overall,
whether the reference price increases or reduces underpricing of the follow-on A-share issuance
depends on the net effect of the possibly harmful anchoring effect and the beneficial informational
effect.
3.4. The hypothesis development
In this section, we develop testable hypotheses for cross-listed Chinese firms that first issue
foreign shares and then domestic A-shares. First, we hypothesize that the price of first issued
foreign share serves as an informative reference for pricing the second issued A-share. According
to Eq. (10) and (11), the estimated A-share valuation is positively associated with the observable
foreign share valuation s′ and the valuation difference c, regardless of whether market participants
suffer from the anchoring bias. Empirically, s′ is proxied by the foreign PE ratio observed before
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the A-share pricing. We use PE ratios instead of price levels since PE ratios are more comparable
across firms. The anchored estimate EA is proxied by the A-share’s offer PE ratio, and the rational
estimate ER is proxied by the aftermarket PE ratio observed in the A-share market after the A-
shares are listed. The testable hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1. For Chinese firms that first issue foreign shares and then A-shares, at the A-share
issuance, ceteris paribus, the A-share’s offer PE ratio and aftermarket PE ratio are positively
associated with the foreign share PE ratio and the valuation differences between the A- and foreign
shares.
We test the anchoring hypothesis by comparing the coefficients on c in Eq. (11) and (10). When
we regress ER and EA on the foreign share valuation s′ and the valuation difference c, we expect
the relation between EA and c to be weaker than that between ER and c. The hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 2. For Chinese firms that first issue foreign shares and then A-shares, at the A-share
issuance, ceteris paribus, the positive association between the A-share’s offer PE and the valuation
difference is weaker than that between the aftermarket PE and the valuation difference.
Following Eq. (14), if investors suffer from the anchoring bias such that γ < 1, the A-share
underpricing is expected to be positively associated with the valuation difference c. The testable
hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 3. For Chinese firms that first issue foreign shares and then A-shares, with the pres-
ence of anchoring effect, ceteris paribus, the A-share underpricing is positively associated with the
valuation difference between the A- and foreign shares.
The psychological literature proposes that the anchoring heuristic persists because it helps to
solve complex problems in a cost-effective way. We try to identify scenarios in which participants
have different propensities to reply on the anchoring heuristic. According to Eq. (14), a higher γ,
which indicates a weaker anchoring propensity, will result in a less positive association between
underpricing and the valuation difference. We formalize the above reasoning as:
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Hypothesis 4. For Chinese firms that first issue foreign shares and then A-shares, when partici-
pants are less likely to resort to the anchoring heuristic, ceteris paribus, the positive association
between the A-share underpricing and the valuation difference is weaker.
Finally, Eq. (14) suggests that a higher σ2θ and a lower σ2ǫ , indicating greater valuation uncer-
tainty for the second issued A-share and higher precision for the foreign share valuation s′, lead
to a stronger positive association between the A-share underpricing and the valuation difference.
Accordingly, we have:
Hypothesis 5. For Chinese firms that first issue foreign shares and then A-shares, when the A-
share valuation is more uncertain or/and the foreign share valuation is more precise, ceteris
paribus, the positive association between the A-share underpricing and the valuation difference
is stronger.
4. Baseline results
4.1. Data and sample distribution
In the empirical tests, we use a unique dataset of 80 Chinese firms that first issued B- or H-
shares and then domestic A-shares during the period from January 1, 1992 to December 31, 2010.3
We check IPO prospectus to ensure that upon the A-share pricing, their corresponding B or H-
shares have been publicly tradable with prices available.4 For firms that first issue foreign B- or
H-shares and then domestic A-shares, we manually collect the offering details on the A-, B-, and
H-share issuance from IPO prospectuses, listing announcements, other public announcements, and
news reports. We also refer to the IPO database provided by the GuoTaiAn Company (GTA). We
3Some might argue that it is desirable to expand our current sample to include Chinese firms cross-listed in the
United States, Singapore, and the United Kingdom. However, most foreign shares of that kind are American Deposi-
tory Receipts (ADRs), which are repackaged B-/H- shares and issued later than or simultaneously with B-/H-shares.
We argue that the B-share market and Hong Kong market are integrated to the global market. At ADR issuance, B-
/H-share prices can be direct reference for the pricing of ADRs and the anchoring bias arguably has a minimal impact.
We thus focus on Chinese firms that are cross-listed on B-share or Hong Kong market only.
4For several firms that first issued B-shares and then A-shares according to the listing date reported by CSMAR,
we find that their A-share prices were actually determined before B-shares were priced after a close examination of
their prospectus. We eliminate these observations.
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retrieve the daily stock price and return data for the A- and B-shares from China Stock Market
Trading Research Database (CSMAR) maintained by GTA, and daily PE data from DataStream.
We obtain financial statement data from GTA. We obtain the daily price, return, and PE data for
the H-shares from DataStream.
Table 1 shows the distribution of sample firms across industries and years. We present statistics
for the full sample in Panel A and find that firms in the industrial and utility industries dominate the
sample. Sub-period statistics reveal that about half of the sample firms issued A-shares during the
earliest subperiod from 1992 to 1998. Among the full sample, 53 firms first issued H-shares on the
Hong Kong exchange and then A-shares on the Chinese securities market (subsample of first-H-
then-A firms), and 27 firms first issued B-shares then A-shares (subsample of first-B-then-A firms),
with statistics shown in Panels B and C, respectively.5 Figure 2 plots the number of A-share IPOs
of sample firms by year. The number of IPOs varies over years.6 A-share listings of first-B-then-A
firms are concentrated in the first half of the sample period. The last first-B-then-A firm issued
its A-shares in 2001, before the B-share market was opened to Chinese domestic investors. There
were no A-share issuances in 2004 due to regulatory restrictions, whereas year 2007 witnessed 12
IPOs by firms that first issued H- and then A-shares.
4.2. The proxy for the valuation difference c
Following Errunza and Miller (2000), we use the realized buy-and-hold returns to proxy for
the cost of capital. This measure essentially uses the ex post realized return to proxy for the ex
5Among the 80 samples, 13 firms issued A-shares more than five years after their respective foreign share issuances.
Two firms with extremely long time lags are Sichuan Expressway, which listed its H-shares in October 1997 and its
A-shares in July 2009, and Guangshen Railway, which listed its H-shares in May 1996 and its A-shares in December
2006. Seven firms issued their A-shares within three months after their respective foreign-share issuances. Jiaoda
Kunji High-Tech issued its A-shares on December 7, 1993, within one month after its H-share issuance.
6Most Chinese firms first issued foreign- and then A-shares for at least four reasons. First, at the beginning of the
Chinese financial reform in the 1990s, the A-share market was in its infancy. Firms intended to extract information
from the foreign share issuance to promote the pricing efficiency in the subsequent A-share issuance. Second, when
the A-share market was underdeveloped in the 1990s, Chinese firms had to rely on the more developed Hong Kong
market for a large issuance. Third, most cross-listed firms are state-owned firms. H-share issuance is viewed as a
political achievement that could help CEO promotion. Forth, by first launching an IPO in the H-share market, a firm
sends out a positive signal to investors, as the listing requirements are more stringent in Hong Kong. Please refer to
Tian (2011) and Fan et al. (2007) for more institutional details on the development of Chinese financial system.
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ante expected return. As shareholders of A- and foreign shares issued by the same firm have
exactly the same cash flow rights and voting rights, the prevailing A-share premium over foreign
shares is attributable to different costs of capital required in respective segmented markets. We
use the buy-and-hold return over a one-year period beginning one day after the A-share listing.
The difference in the returns on the A-share (BHRet A) and the foreign share (BHRet F) is used
to measure the valuation difference. Arguably, as the A-share price is usually higher than the
price of corresponding foreign share, BHRet A tends to be lower than BHRet F. Consequently, the
valuation difference c, as defined in Section 3, is positive.
Panel A of Table 2 shows that the average one-year return on A-shares is only 2.67%, much
lower than the average return of 28.40% on the corresponding foreign shares.7 Untabulated paired
t-test reveals that this difference is statistically significant.
4.3. The informational role played by the foreign share price
First, we align our research with the literature on the informational role played by the reference
price. We argue that market participants possibly suffer from the anchoring bias when determining
the A-share offer price. Thus, we use the offer PE ratio to proxy for EA, the anchored estimate. In
addition, by assuming an efficient secondary market, we use the PE ratio observed one month after
the A-share listing to proxy for ER, the rational estimate.8
We run the following regressions to test Hypothesis 1:
PE Aft1m = a0 + a1DFBTA+ a2T + a3PE MKT + a4PE F ++a5BHRet F + a6BHRet A+ ε, (17)
PE Offer = b0 + b1DFBTA+ b2T + b3PE MKT + b4PE F ++b5BHRet F + b6BHRet A+ ǫ. (18)
7Two firms are newly-listed and thus do not have sufficiently long trading histories to calculate the one year buy-
and-hold returns. One sample firm, Jilin Chemical Industrial Co., was delisted from the Hong Kong market three years
after its A-share listing, which does not incorporate the survivorship bias into the one-year buy-and-hold returns.
8We choose this aftermarket PE ratio for several reasons. First, the PE ratio on the first trading day may contain
any under- or over-reactions as the A-share market may not be fully rational. Second, the price support provided by
the underwriters usually ends by the end of the first trading month. The distortion brought about by the price support
will thus disappear one month after the A-share listing. Third, an aftermarket PE that is too far away from the listing
is not appropriate as it could be affected by noise in the aftermarket. As the time lag between the PE ratio and the
A-share listing increases, the PE ratio becomes less relevant to the rational valuation level at the A-share issuance.
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In model (17), the dependent variable is the aftermarket PE, the proxy for ER. In model (18), the
dependent variable is the offer PE ratio, the proxy for EA.9 In both models (17) and (18), as well
as in the following regressions, we include a dummy variable DFBTA, which takes the value of
one for the first-B-then-A subsample firms and zero for the first-H-then-A subsample firms. The
control of DFBTA helps to address the concern that the anchoring propensity might differ in the
B- and H-share markets. Besides, we include a year T variable to control the general regulatory
improvements in Chinese securities over time. T takes the value of 1 for A-share IPOs listed in
1992, 2 for 1993, all the way up to 19 in 2010.10 First, we estimate models (17) and (18) separately
using the cross-section of 80 sample firms that first issued foreign shares and then A-shares. We
assume that the A-share offer price is determined five days before the A-share listing and search for
important information available at that time. PE MKT is the market-level PE ratio in the A-share
market five days before the A-share listing, and we use it to control for the aggregate valuation level
in the A-share market. PE F is the issuer’s foreign share PE ratio observed five days before the A-
share listing, and we use it to proxy for s′. BHRet F and BHRet A are the one-year buy-and-hold
returns of the foreign share and the A-share, respectively. The difference between BHRet F and
BHRet A is the proxy for the valuation difference c. According to Hypothesis 1, we expect the
coefficient on PE F to be positive in both models, and the coefficients onBHRet F andBHRet A
to be positive and negative, respectively.
We report the regression results in columns (1) and (2) of Table 3. We find that both the after-
market PE and the offer PE are positively associated with PE F , strongly supporting the informa-
tional role played by the foreign share price in pricing the A-share. Moreover, the aftermarket PE
is positively associated with BHRet F and negatively associated with BHRet A. In contrast, we
find no statistically significant relation between PE Offer and BHRet F or BHRet A, consistent
9 The offer PE ratio is self-reported by Chinese issuers, who can selectively choose to report either the fully-diluted
PE after issuance, the weighted-average PE after issuance, or the fully-diluted PE before issuance. We assign value to
the offer PE following such a sequence.
10We could also include a set of year dummies into the regression. Such an approach, however, will substantially
reduce the degree of freedom in the regression as our sample size is quite small. As a compromise, we use a single Year
T variable to control the unknown time-varying effect. We also perform an alternative robustness check by including
year dummies, and the untabulated results are qualitatively similar.
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with Hypothesis 2 that ER is associated with both s′ and c whereas EA is only associated with s′.
The insignificant coefficient on DFBTA indicate that there is no significant difference in the A-
share valuation between firms with B- and H-shares. The coefficient on T is also indistinguishable
from zero, suggesting that there is no significant change in PE Offer over time.11
To formally test Hypothesis 2, we jointly estimate models (17) and (18) by forcing aj = bj , j =
0, ..., 4. We report the estimation results in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3. We test the null
hypothesis that a4 = b4 and a5 = b5 and report the Wald-statistics in column (5). The results show
that the association between PE Aft1m and BHRet F is significantly more positive than that
between PE Offer and BHRet F , and that the association between PE Aft1m and BHRet A is
marginally more negative than that between PE Offer and BHRet A. The result suggests that the
relation between ER and c is significantly stronger than that between EA and c, consistent with
Hypothesis 2.
4.4. The anchoring role played by the foreign share price
The evidence discussed in Section 4.3 hints the existence of the anchoring effect. In a cost-
effective way, decision markers tend to begin with an easily available starting point and then make
adjustment to get a final estimate. We argue that market participants tend to adopt this anchoring
and adjustment framework in determining the A-share offer price to simplify the task on hand. The
cross-listed foreign share, due to its similarity and prominence, is naturally the starting point. In
this section, we perform analysis within the anchoring-and-adjustment framework and investigate
the extent of the insufficient adjustment.
11 The number of observations falls below the full sample size of 80 in regressions due to missing values on some
key variables. See Table 2 for detailed information. E.g., in column (1) of Table 3, PE MKT is missing for three firms
that issued A-shares in late 2010 and for one firm that experienced thirteen days of market holidays right before its
A-share issuance. PE F is missing for one firm, which has infrequent B-share trading before its A-share issuance.
BHRet F and BHRet A are missing for two firms, respectively, which do not have sufficiently long trading histories to
calculate the one year buy-and-hold returns. In column (2), PE Offer, the dependent variable, is missing for six firms
that did not report their offer PE ratio in IPOs conducted in the early 1990s.
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4.4.1. Upward adjustment
We use the offer premium to measure the magnitude of adjustment made in the offering process.
Prem Offer is the A-share offer price over the foreign share closing price five days before the A-
share listing and then minus one. This premium is the percentage of the upward adjustment made
by decision makers, which is possibly insufficient due to the anchoring bias.
Panel A of Table 2 shows that, after adjusting for the exchange rate, the A-shares on average
are offered at a price 86% higher than that of the corresponding foreign shares, which is signif-
icantly different from zero. We also calculate a market-aggregate A-foreign valuation premium
Prem MKT, using the closing prices of all cross-listed AB shares or AH shares five days before the
A-share listing. Table 2 shows that the average Prem MKT is 249%, which is much higher than the
average offer premium (86%), indicating that the upward adjustment made in the offer premium is
likely to be insufficient.
Market participants should make adjustments for the valuation difference between the seg-
mented markets. For a cross-listed firm, the valuation difference between its A- and foreign shares
is attributable to the difference in costs of capital in the two markets. We use the following model
in the cross-sectional regression:
Prem Offer = a0 + a1Prem MKT + a2DFBTA+ a3T + b1BHRet F + b2BHRet A+ ε, (19)
where the independent variables are as defined in model (17). Ceteris paribus, we expect the offer
premium to be higher when the cost of capital is lower for the A-share and/or higher for the foreign
share. We thus expect b1 to be positive and b2 to be negative.
We report the regression results in column (1) of Table 4. The coefficient on Prem MKT is
significantly positive, suggesting that the prevailing market-aggregate A-foreign premium strongly
affects the offer premium. As expected, the coefficient on BHRet F is significantly positive and
the coefficient on BHRet A is negative, although insignificant, indicating that decision makers take
the valuation difference c at the firm level into consideration at least partially. The coefficient on
the year variable T is significantly negative, suggesting that the spread between the A-share offer
price and corresponding B-/H-share trading price narrows in the recent period.
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4.4.2. Insufficient adjustment
Now we examine whether the upward adjustment is sufficient, i.e., whether the offer premium
is sufficiently high. According to Eq. (14), if market participants are subject to the anchoring bias
and thus adjust for the valuation difference c only partially in determining the A-share offer price,
the level of A-share underpricing will be positively associated with c. We measure the underpricing
(IR A) by the IPO first-day return, which is the percentage difference between the first-day closing
price and the offer price.
Table 2 provides the statistics of the A-share underpricing for the 80 sample firms. Panel A
shows that, on average, these sample firms with foreign shares still suffer from great underpricing
at the A-share issuances, with an average first-day return of 93% and a median of 76%. We use
all available IPO data recorded in CSMAR to update the statistics reported by Chen et al. (2008).
After eliminating outliers with a first-day return higher than 100 (10000%), we end up with a
sample containing 2,105 IPOs from 1992 to 2010 with an average underpricing of 187% and a
median of 95%. A comparison of A-share underpricing between cross-listed firms and typical
Chinese firms hints that the benefits brought by foreign shares as references are rather marginal,
which may be due to the harmful anchoring effect.
We run the following regression to test the anchoring Hypotheses 3, 4 and 5:
IR A = a0 + a1DFBTA+ a2T + a3Prem Resid + b1BHRet F + b2BHRet A (20)
+c1BHRet F ×Dummy + c2BHRet A×Dummy + ε,
where Prem Resid is the residual from model (19), used to control for the upward adjustment made
in the offering process. We use the residual rather than Prem Offer to mitigate the multicollinearity
problem brought by the structural relationship as modeled in Eq. (19). According to Hypothesis
3, we expect the underpricing to be positively associated with c if the anchoring effect exists such
that the upward adjustment is insufficient. We thus expect IR A to be positively associated with
BHRet F and negatively associated with BHRet A, which results in a positive b1 and negative b2.
We use three dummies to proxy for investors’ anchoring propensity to test the anchoring Hy-
pothesis 4. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) suggest that market participants are less likely to rely
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on heuristics when more information is available. As large-scale issuances usually gain higher
media coverage, which helps to produce more information, we expect investors to have weaker
anchoring propensity in these cases. We set a dummy DLarge to be equal to one when the amount
of inflation-adjusted gross proceeds collected from the A-share issuance is greater than the sample
median and zero otherwise. Chapman and Johnson (2002) advise that monetary incentives help to
reduce behavioral biases. A related scenario is when the state ownership is substantially diluted
through an IPO. New share issuance is equivalent to the disposal of state-owned shares in this pri-
vatization process. Most managers in the state-owned enterprises used to be bureaucrats who care
about their political future. In this situation, the incentive to reduce “money left on the table” is
strong enough for managers to offset the satisfaction from the potential appreciation of the retained
shares (Loughran and Ritter, 2002). Therefore, we expect the anchoring bias to be weaker when
the state ownership is diluted to a greater extent. We thus propose a second dummy, D∆SO, which
takes the value of one when the reduction in state-ownership following the A-share issuance is
greater than the sample median and zero otherwise. Loughran and Ritter (2004) argue that issuers
have changed their objective function to focus less on reducing underpricing but more on non-price
services such as analyst coverage. Since prestigious underwriters could satisfy issuers though com-
petitive non-price services, they have arguably weaker incentives to struggle through the “painful”
pricing-adjustment process as suggested in Section 3.2 and thus care less about “money left on
the table”. Therefore, we expect underwriters with better reputation to be more prone to suffer
from the anchoring bias. We use the underwriting fees to proxy for the underwriter reputation,
with higher fees representing better reputation. The dummy DFee takes the value of one when
the flotation cost as a percentage of the gross proceed in the A-share issuance is smaller than the
sample median and zero otherwise. All these three dummies are ex ante variables, known before
the A-share issuance. And for all the three dummies, the expected coefficients on their interaction
terms with BHRet F and BHRet A have signs opposite to that of the coefficients on BHRet R and
BHRet A. Thus, we expect c1 to be negative and c2 to be positive.
The last dummy, Dσ2θ , is an ex-post variable, used to test the anchoring Hypothesis 5. We use
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the turnover ratio on the first trading day of A-shares to proxy for the valuation uncertainty, with a
higher turnover ratio representing greater valuation uncertainty (higher σ2θ ). The dummy variable
Dσ2θ takes the value of one when the turnover is higher than the sample median and zero otherwise.
According to Hypothesis 5, the anchoring bias has greater influence over the offer price when the
A-share valuation involves more uncertainty. We thus expect the signs of the coefficients on the
interaction terms to be the same as those of the coefficients on BHRet F and BHRet A. Therefore,
when Dσ2θ is used, we expect c1 to be positive and c2 to be negative.
We report the regression results of model (20) in columns (2) to (7) of Table 4. We first
examine whether underpricing is associated with the valuation difference measured by BHRet F
and BHRet A. The result in column (2) shows that the coefficient on BHRet A is significantly
negative. We further control for the offer premium in column (3) to capture the upward adjustment
that is already made in the offering process. The coefficient on BHRet F is insignificant, whereas
the coefficient on BHRet A remains significantly negative. It suggests that market participants have
fully taken the relative cost of capital of foreign shares into consideration, which is not surprising as
the foreign share valuation is quite evident. However, they tend to overlook the cost of capital of A-
shares, which is more difficult to estimate. As a result, they under-react to the valuation information
associated with the A-shares, but not to that associated with the foreign shares. The evidence
is consistent with the insufficient adjustment argument and supports Hypothesis 3. Throughout
columns (2) to (8), the coefficients on DFBTA and T are both indistinguishable from zero.
We then include the interaction terms between dummies and BHRet F and BHRet A into model
(20) and report the results in columns (4) to (8). In column (4), where the interactions with DLarge
are included, the coefficients on BHRet F, BHRet A and the interaction terms are all significantly
different from zero with predicted signs. The results lend strong support to Hypothesis 4 by re-
vealing that market participants are less likely to suffer from the anchoring bias if the issuances
are of a large scale. The interactions with dummy D∆SO are included in column (5). BHRet A
has a significantly negative coefficient and the interaction term between BHRet A and D∆SO has
a significantly positive coefficient. It suggests that when the state ownership is diluted to a greater
27
extent because of new share issuance, the decision makers have stronger incentives to make a more
sufficient adjustment. The evidence is also consistent with Hypothesis 4. In column (6), we include
the interactions with DFee. As expected, the coefficient on BHRet F is significantly positive, and
that on BHRet A is significantly negative. The coefficients on the interaction terms are both statis-
tically significant with predicted signs. This evidence further supports Hypothesis 4 by showing
that more reputable underwriters, proxied by higher flotation costs charged, suffer from a stronger
anchoring bias.
We add the interaction terms with dummy Dσ2θ into the regression in column (7). The result
shows that when the A-share valuation is less ambiguous with Dσ2θ = 0, IR A is not significantly
associated with the proxies for the valuation difference c, indicating a weak anchoring effect. In
comparison, when the A-share has greater valuation uncertainty with dummy Dσ2θ = 1, the coeffi-
cient on BHRet F is significantly more positive and that on BHRet A is significantly more negative,
indicating that the anchoring bias exerts stronger influence in this case. The results support Hy-
pothesis 5.
Finally, we include the interaction terms of all four dummies with the buy-and-hold returns
into the regression and report the result in column (8). Consistent with Hypothesis 3, even after the
interaction terms with four dummies are included, the coefficient on BHRet F is still significantly
positive, and that on BHRet A is significantly negative. Consistent with Hypotheses 4 and 5, the
coefficients on the interaction terms with DLarge and with Dσ2θ remain statistically significant,
indicating that both DLarge, a proxy for the degree of anchoring bias γ, and Dσ2θ , a proxy for the
valuation uncertainty, affect the degree of the anchoring effect. 12
In summary, the empirical evidence in Sections 4.3 and 4.4 supports the dual role hypothesis.
For cross-listed firms, the foreign share valuation provides important information for pricing the A-
shares. Cross-sectionally, the foreign share price predicts the A-share offer price and aftermarket
12The number of observations is less than the full sample size of 80 in regressions because of missing values on
some key variables. See Table 2 and footnote 11 for more details. In addition, DFee is missing for four sample firms
that do not report their underwriting fees. Dσ2
θ
is missing for one sample firm that has missing first-day turnover in
CSMAR.
28
price. Within the anchoring framework, market participants start from the foreign share price and
adjust upward according to the difference in costs of capital between the two segmented markets.
We argue that the adjustment is insufficient by showing that the A-share underpricing is associated
with the difference in costs of capital, and that the association is stronger when the decision mark-
ers tend to suffer from a stronger anchoring bias and when the A-share valuation involves more
uncertainty.13
5. Robustness checks
5.1. Regulatory underpricing
Tian (2011) argues that the pricing cap and strict quota system lead to “regulatory underpric-
ing”, contributing to the extremely high level of underpricing in China. He states that “in several
internal guidelines issued during different periods, the CSRC [China Securities Regulatory Com-
mission] sets the ceiling of the [PE] multiplier as 15 to 20 times earnings, which is the pricing cap
of IPO shares.” The relation between the existence of the regulatory cap and the level of underpric-
ing, however, is ambiguous according to their empirical findings. To control for the possible effect
of regulatory constraints, we check the offer PE of our sample firms. We consider firms with an
offer PE around 15, 16, 18, and 20 times to be capped by regulation.14 Using this method, only 13
13Eq. (16) illustrates that the beneficial informational role and the harmful anchoring role of foreign shares have
opposing impacts on the underpricing of corresponding A-shares. Hence the net influence of the existence of foreign
shares on A-share underpricing is an empirical issue. We thus conduct a matching test, in which cross-listed firms
are matched to firms without foreign shares but with similar A-share IPO characteristics in terms of industry, date
of issuance, gross proceeds, and pre-IPO market returns. We find that firms with foreign shares have slightly lower
underpricing than their matching firms without foreign shares. Moreover, the difference in underpricing between firms
with foreign shares and matching firms is significantly negative when the valuation difference is mild, but close to
zero when the valuation difference is large. The evidence suggests that the anchoring effect is weaker and tends to
be dominated by the informational effect given lower valuation difference. When the valuation difference increases,
the anchoring effect grows and offsets the informational effect. The matching test, however, has its weakness. The
H-share issuers are of great strategic importance to the government and are usually monopolies and very large, making
it difficult to find perfect matches for them. We do not report the matching test results for brevity, and these results are
available upon request.
14These multiples are the PE caps historically prevalent according to Tian (2011). We treat PEs within the range
of [14.9,15.1], [15.9,16.1], [17.9,18.1), or [19.9, 20.1) as being capped. According to Tian (2011), the pricing cap is
time-variant and applicable to all issuing firms at that time. Thus, our measure is imprecise and may mistreat some
firms that just happen to issue at those multiples. Also, even if a firm issues at a PE higher than the cap, it may still
be affected by the cap. Chinese issuing firms even have a certain degree of freedom in choosing the PE to report to
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out of the 80 sample firms are possibly capped. We use a dummy variable DCap to control for the
regulatory constraint, which equals one for capped firms and zero otherwise. We add DCap into
model (20) and examine whether the results reported in Table 4 are robust.
We report the regression results in Table 5. The coefficient on DCap is significantly negative
across all columns, indicating that firms that are suspected to be capped actually have lower un-
derpricing. It is hard to reconcile these results with the findings in Tian (2011), which argues that
the pricing cap creates excess demand for securities and thus results in greater underpricing. After
we control for DCap and other explanatory variables, the results remain similar to those reported
in Table 4. Untabulated tests show that the results hold even after we control for individual cap
dummies DCap15, DCap16, DCap18, and DCap20 in the regressions. It suggests that the regula-
tory constraint cannot fully account for the association between the A-share underpricing and the
valuation difference.
It is interesting to note that the Security Law, which took effect in July 1999, stipulated that the
share offer price should be determined through consultation between the issuer and the underwriter.
CSRC explicitly abolished this pricing cap in June 10, 2009. Although the regulatory constraints
may still exist in a less noticeable form, we expect them to be less relevant in the future.
5.2. Sentiment
In Section 4, we implicitly assume an efficient market in which the aftermarket A-share price
represents the fair valuation and the first-day return fairly proxies for the correction of anchoring
bias incurred in the primary market. Some might argue that the secondary market price can be
biased upward due to sentiment. We contend that as long as the price errors created by sentiment
are not systematically related to the difference in costs of capital, the results in Table 4 still support
our insufficient adjustment and anchoring argument.
To control for the influence of time-varying sentiment, we follow Baker and Wurgler (2006)
CSRC (see Footnote 9), suggesting that the issuer can circumvent the cap to some extent by reporting a lower PE that
is measured using alternative methods.
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to construct a sentiment index for the Chinese A-share market using data from CSMAR.15 We
include Sentiment1 and Sentiment2 into model (20), and find only weak support for the sentiment
argument. The results in Table 5 show that the coefficient on Sentiment1 is significantly posi-
tive only in the parsimonious models in columns with even numbers. And the relation between
the A-share underpricing and BHRet A, BHRet F and the interaction terms remain qualitatively
unchanged. It is therefore difficult to argue that the results documented in Section 4 are simply
driven by sentiment in the secondary market.
5.3. Additional control variables
In addition to the regulatory cap and the market sentiment, we control for several variables that
have cross-sectional explanatory power for the underpricing.
We follow previous studies (e.g., Tian (2011)) to control for Lag Ann List, the log of the time
lag in calendar days between the announcement of a prospectus and the actual listing date. This
lag can be very long in China, and it reflects the lockup risk faced by investors in the primary
market. We thus expect the A-share underpricing to be positively associated with Lag Ann List.
Titman and Trueman (1986) show that the choice of auditor influences the amount of information
produced before listing. We expect reputable auditors to help reduce information asymmetry and
signal the quality of the firm, thus mitigating the underpricing. We include a dummy DAuditor
to control for auditor identity, which equals one if the sample firm is audited by a Big Four au-
diting firm and zero otherwise. Following Welch (1989), we expect that the underpricing level
15We calculate the aggregate closed-end fund discount (CEFD) at the end of each month using the daily closed-end
fund data. We collect the monthly trading value and the market value of tradable shares and calculate the aggregated
turnover ratio in the A-share market (TURN). We use the IPO data to calculate the number of IPOs (NIPO) and the
average underpricing level (RIPO) in each month. We also calculate the share of equity issues in total equity and debt
issues in each month (S). A firm that pays cash dividends is treated as a dividend payer in that quarter. For each
firm, we match its book value reported in the annual financial statement, which is assumed to be released at the end of
April, to month-end market value to obtain the monthly market-to-book ratio. We then calculate the dividend premium
PD−ND , which is the log difference in the average market-to-book ratio between payers and non-payers. We estimate
the principal components of the six proxies and their lags. We find that the first principal component explains 31%
of the sample variance and the second principal component explains additional 16% of the variance. We compute the
correlation between the first/second principal component and the current and lagged values of each proxy. Finally, we
define Sentiment1 as the first principal component of the correlation matrix of the six variables, each respective proxy’s
lead or lag, whichever has higher correlation with the first principal component. Similarly, Sentiment2 is defined for
the second principal component.
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of previous foreign share issuance helps to leave a good taste in the mouth of investors and thus
mitigates the A-share underpricing. We thus include the underpricing level of the previous foreign
share issuance, IR F , to control for this signaling effect. SO% is the percentage of state owner-
ship before the A-share issuance. Higher state ownership indicates separation of ownership and
management, which is often associated with lower efficiency and thus predicts greater underpric-
ing. Loughran and Ritter (2002) find that issuers under-react to public information such as market
returns. Hence, we control for CRetM, which is the market return cumulated over a two-week pe-
riod ending one week before the A-share listing. We expect IR A to be positively associated with
CRetM. Lag FA is the log of time lag between the A-share and previous foreign share listing. In a
market that is not fully efficient, a longer trading history of foreign shares might help to produce
more information and thus reduce the A-share underpricing. We thus expect the coefficient on
Lag FA to be negative. Finally, we define Ratio AF as the proceeds collected from the A-share
issuance divided by those from the H-share issuance, after the adjustment of exchange rates and
inflation. A lower Ratio AF implies higher probability of excess demand for A-shares, and predicts
greater underpricing.
We show the descriptive statistics of the control variables in Panel A of Table 5. We then
include these control variables in model (20) and present the multivariate regression results in
Panel B. In columns (1) and (2), we include all control variables but no interaction terms. In the
following columns, we include the interaction terms of buy-and-hold returns with the dummies
DLarge, D∆SO, DFee and Dσ2θ . We report two versions of tests for each model specification. In
odd columns, we include all control variables. As our sample size is small, using too many controls
will reduce the model’s explanatory power. Thus, we use the stepwise method to retain important
variables only and report regression results in even columns.
The results in Panel B of Table 5 are similar to the baseline results in Table 4. The coefficient
on BHRet A is significantly negative in columns (1) to (4) and (6) to (8), and the coefficient on
BHRet F is significantly positive in columns (3), (4), and (7) to (10), strongly supporting Hypoth-
esis 3. The coefficients on the interaction terms of buy-and-hold returns with DLarge and DFee
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are significant with predicted signs, as shown in columns (3), (4), (7) and (8), supporting Hypothe-
sis 4. In columns (9) and (10), we include the interaction terms withDσ2θ . As the A-share valuation
involves less uncertainty with Dσ2θ = 0, the coefficient on BHRet F is significantly negative, in-
dicating that decision makers actually overreact to the foreign share valuation in the adjustment
stage. When Dσ2θ = 1, however, the coefficient on the interaction term almost offsets the negative
coefficient on BHRet F and makes the coefficient on BHRet A negative, suggesting under-reaction
when the valuation uncertainty is high, consistent with Hypothesis 5.
Among the control variables, the coefficient on DFBTA is significantly negative, suggesting
that subsamples with H-shares tend to suffer from higher A-share underpricing than those with
B-shares. The coefficient on T is significantly positive, suggesting higher underpricing in more
recent years. The evidence is not surprising since we find that the spread between A- and B-
/H- share offer price is lower in recent period (Section 4.4.1), which might result from the growing
bargaining power of retail investors who arguably suffer from a stronger anchoring bias. Consistent
with previous studies, we find that the underpricing is negatively related to Proceed, indicating that
a larger issuance tends to have lower underpricing. The coefficient on ∆SO is indistinguishable
from zero. Fee is positively associated with underpricing, consistent with the agency argument
of Loughran and Ritter (2004) given the assumption that IPOs with higher flotation costs are more
likely to be underwritten by more reputable underwriters. The coefficient on IR F is significantly
negative in columns (1), (3), (4) and (5), indicating that the underpricing in an earlier foreign
share issuance helps to reduce the underpricing in subsequent A-share issuance. The coefficient on
Lag FA is indistinguishable from zero. Consistent with Tian (2011), Lag Ann List is significantly
positively related to underpricing. The coefficient on CRetM is significantly positive, suggesting
that the offer price does not fully reflect information in the secondary market. The coefficient on
DAuditor is significantly negative, suggesting that hiring a Big Four auditing firm helps to reduce
underpricing. The coefficient on Ratio AF is negative but insignificant.16
16We include Ratio AF as when the A-float is small relative to the H-float, shortage of available stocks in the A-
IPO might lead to greater A-IPO underpricing. The insignificant coefficient on Ratio AF , however, does not support
such an argument. A possible explanation is that even though the ratio of A-share issuance is low, the absolute scale
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5.4. The impact of QDII
On April 13, 2006, the Chinese government announced the Qualified Domestic Institutional
Investor (QDII) scheme, allowing Chinese institutions and residents to entrust certain Chinese
commercial banks to invest on financial products overseas, but the investment was limited to
fixed-income and money market products. On May 11, 2007, Chinese government announced
a widening scope for QDII investment. Banks can now offer stock-related products under certain
restrictions. By the end of February 2012, the total approved amount of QDII has grown to 75.2
billion U.S. dollar, which is greater than the approved capital amount of QFII.17
Arguably, QDII mitigates the investment barriers between the Chinese domestic market and
the foreign market to some extent. Hence, the anchoring effect brought by foreign prices should be
weaker after the implementation of the QDII scheme. In our sample, 13 firms listed their A-shares
after May 11, 2007, and it would be quite difficult to perform meaningful tests on such a small
sample. Thus, we rerun regression models (17), (18), (19) and (20) using sample firms that issued
A-shares before May 11, 2007. In total, we have 67 sample firms. Untabulated results are similar to
those in Tables 3 and 4, rendering support to our three hypotheses. The results suggest that before
the QDII scheme could fully liberalize the Chinese stock market, the foreign share valuation still
plays both an informational and anchoring role.
Given the fact that the aggregate quota allocated to QDII is only around 2.6% of the size of the
A-share market, which was 2.9 trillion U.S. dollar at the end of February 2012, we argue that QDII
still has a small scale and relatively limited influence. QDII alone is difficult to provide sufficient
investable products for the Chinese domestic capital, wipe off the A-H premium, and eliminate the
prevailing anchoring effect in the markets.
of A-share issuance is not necessarily small. For instance, Bank of China issued H-shares in June 2006 and A-shares
in July 2006, and the amount of A-share proceeds was only 18% of the total proceeds (adjusted for exchange rate and
inflation). However, the A-share proceed alone was as large as 20 billion Chinese Yuan (about 2.6 billion U.S. dollar),
and over half of shares were sold to retail investors. For a typical A-share issuance in the Chinese market, the average
proceed is only .9 million Chinese Yuan. Even for the 80 sample firms investigated in this study, the average A-share
proceeds are only 5.9 billion Chinese Yuan. Hence, it is hard to argue A-share shortage in the case of Bank of China.
17The number is disclosed by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange of China, http://www.safe.gov.cn/.
34
5.5. Skewed variables
In our sample, both Prem Offer and IR A are skewed to the right, with a skewness of 3.24
and 1.35, respectively. To address the concern that the variables are not normally distributed, we
perform additional tests to use the log version of the two variables (log(variable+1)) as dependent
variables in models (19) and (20), respectively. The results remain similar to those reported in Table
4, rendering further support to our anchoring Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5.
5.6. The influence of outliers
In untabulated tests, we also try to eliminate the influence of outliers on our empirical results.
We delete observations with first-day returns higher than 300% and redo all the tests in Tables 3
and 4. The results remain qualitatively unchanged, suggesting that the evidence documented in
Sections 4.3 and 4.4 is not purely driven by the extreme values of variables.
5.7. Measurement period of buy-and-hold returns
As a further robustness check, we measure the cost of capital based on buy-and-hold returns
calculated over different holding periods. Specifically, we measure costs of capital of A-shares
and foreign shares using six-month, two-year, or three-year buy-and-hold returns. The alternative
methods of measuring cost of capital do not alter our main results reported in Tables 3 and 4.
6. Conclusion
In this study, we propose that for a firm cross-listed in multiple markets, in pricing its subse-
quently issued share, the price of its first issued share plays both an informational and anchoring
role. Past studies have examined the informational role of the reference price extensively, and
our study contributes to the literature by investigating the anchoring role. We develop a model
to incorporate the beneficial informational role and the possible harmful anchoring role played by
the reference price. Our empirical investigation based on a group of Chinese firms that first issue
foreign shares and then domestic A-shares supports all model predictions. We find evidence show-
ing that market participants fail to fully adjust for the difference in costs of capital between the
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A-share and foreign-share markets due to the anchoring bias, resulting in the A-share offer price
being anchored to the foreign share price.
This study has important implications for the international financing literature. In the trend
toward global integration, more and more firms are striving to raise capital in both foreign and
domestic markets. We remind issuers that the informational role played by the price of an existing
share is limited in the cross-listing scenario, as cost of capital differs between segmented markets,
and that the anchoring effect may weaken the informational role of the reference price.
Our study has general implications for cross-listed firms beyond IPOs. The process of collect-
ing information in the primary market is notoriously challenging. When the valuation uncertainty
is high, market participants tend to rely on certain heuristics to simplify the valuation process.
In this situation, an informative reference could help to reduce valuation uncertainty. However,
decision-makers need to be cautious about the underlying differences between the target and the
reference. As shown in this study, insufficient adjustment to new information leads to the anchoring
effect, which will offset the information content of the reference.
Our study helps market participants to understand the influence of market segmentation on
the pricing of cross-listed shares better. It has special implications for Chinese policy-makers by
suggesting that the A-H “arbitrage” is not appropriate as long as the Chinese market is not fully
liberalized. The “A+H” IPO mechanism, or issuing A- and H-shares simultaneously at the same
price, is also inferior as it neglects the fact that investors require different rates of returns on the
two markets.
This study also has its limitations. First, we have a small sample of only 80 cross-listed Chinese
firms. The small sample itself limits the power of statistical tests. Second, the cost of capital
is notoriously difficult to measure. Ex-post realized return may not be the perfect measure of
cost of capital, but it is objective, easily observable, and has been widely used in the literature to
proxy for cost of capital. Third, the Chinese stock market is not completely free from government
intervention even after the legislation of the Security Law in 1999, as CSRC may still influence the
A-share pricing in a less noticeable way.
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Figure 1: The median PE ratio in A-, B-share, and Hong Kong markets.
This figure plots the median price-to-earning (PE) ratios in Chinese domestic and foreign stock markets over
time. The thick solid line represents the time-varying median of PE ratios in the A-share market, the thin
dashed line plots the median of PE for B-share market, and the thin solid line plots the median of PE for the
Hong Kong market.
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Figure 2: The number of A-share listings by sample firms across the years.
This figure plots the number of A-share listings across the years based on the 80 sample firms that first
issued foreign shares and then issued A-shares. The solid bar represents the number of A-share listings by
sample firms that first issued H-shares in Hong Kong and then issued A-shares. The dashed bar represents
the number of A-share listings by sample firms that first issued B-shares and then A-shares.
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Table 1: Sample distributions.
This table reports the distribution of A-share issuances by first-foreign-then-A sample firms across industries
and years. We categorize sample firms according to CSMAR’s “INDCD” industry classification and the
subperiod of A-shares issuance. Panel A presents the statistics of the full sample, and Panels B and C report
the statistics of first-H-then-A firms and first-B-then-A firms, respectively.
1992-1998 1999-2004 2005-2010 Total
Panel A: Full sample of first-foreign-then-A firms
Finance - - 5 5
Utilities 4 7 8 19
Properties - - 1 1
Conglomerates 3 1 4
Industrials 24 13 10 47
Commerce 4 - 4
Total 35 21 24 80
Panel B: Subsample of first-H-then-A firms
Finance - - 5 5
Utilities 3 5 8 16
Properties - - 1 1
Conglomerates 1 1 - 2
Industrials 14 5 10 29
Commerce - - - -
Total 18 11 24 53
Panel C: Subsample of first-B-then-A firms
Finance - - - -
Utilities 1 2 - 3
Properties - - - -
Conglomerates 2 - - 2
Industrials 10 8 - 18
Commerce 4 - - 4
Total 17 10 - 27
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Table 2: Summary statistics of major variables.
This table reports the descriptive statistics of major variables in the A-share listing for first-foreign-then-
A firms. Panel A shows the summary statistics, and Panel B reports the correlation coefficients with the
Pearson correlation reported in the lower left triangle and the Spearman correlation reported in the upper
right triangle. IR A is the A-share underpricing level, calculated by the closing price on the first day of
the A-share listing over the offer price and then minus one. PE F is the PE of corresponding foreign share
observed five days before the A-share listing. PE Offer is the A-share offer PE reported by the issuer in
the offering. Prem Offer is calculated by the A-share offer price over the corresponding foreign share price
five days before the A-share listing and then minus one. Prem MKT refers to the market-aggregate A-share
premium over B- (or H-) share prices, calculated using all cross-listed A-H or A-B shares five-days before
the A-share listing. BHRet F and BHRet A are the one-year buy-and-hold returns since the second day of
A-share listing for foreign and A-shares, respectively. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels respectively.
Panel A: Summary statistics
N Mean Std. Error t-value Maximum Median Minimum
IR A 80 92.77% 8.43% 11.00 348.89% 75.72% 0.00%
PE F 79 16.72 1.31 12.74 56.50 13.05 2.80
PE Offer 74 22.44 1.67 13.47 97.80 18.80 3.09
Prem Offer 80 86.05% 15.40% 5.59 915.49% 45.99% -53.43%
Prem MKT 77 249.35% 23.25% 10.72 1207.09% 207.75% -12.41%
BHRet F 78 28.40% 13.14% 2.16 887.41% 14.17% -82.40%
BHRet A 78 2.67% 8.83% 0.30 439.81% -16.97% -75.32%
Panel B: Correlation table
IR A PE F PE Offer Prem Offer Prem MKT BHRet F BHRet A
IR A 0.02 -0.24** -0.22* 0.12 -0.16 -0.17
PE F -0.02 0.57*** -0.65*** -0.45*** -0.22* -0.11
PE Offer -0.18 0.69*** -0.09 -0.21* -0.02 -0.15
Prem Offer -0.15 -0.40*** 0.06 0.64*** 0.39*** -0.02
Prem MKT 0.01 -0.28** -0.13 0.50*** 0.27** 0.05
BHRet F -0.18 -0.19 -0.03 0.27** 0.11 0.56***
BHRet A -0.26** -0.10 -0.03 -0.08 -0.07 0.53***
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Table 3: The informational role of the foreign share price.
This table reports the estimation results of models (17) and (18):
PE Aft1m = a0 + a1DFBTA + a2T + a3PE MKT + a4PE F + a5BHRet F + a6BHRet A + ε, (17)
PE Offer = b0 + b1DFBTA + b2T + b3PE Mkt + b4PE F + b5BHRet F + b6BHRet A + ǫ, (18)
where PE Aft1m is the A-share’s log PE ratio observed one month after the A-share listing. PE Offer is the
A-share’s log offer PE reported by the issuer. DFBTA is a dummy variable, which takes the value of one if
the firm first issues B- and then A-shares, and zero if the firm first issues H- and then A-shares. PE MKT
is the market-level PE ratio in the A-share market five days before the A-share listing. PE F is the log
PE of corresponding foreign share observed five days before the A-share listing. BHRet F and BHRet A
are the one-year buy-and-hold returns since the second day of the A-share listing for foreign and A-shares,
respectively. T takes the value of 1 for A-share IPOs listed in 1992, 2 for 1993, ..., and 19 for 2010. We
first estimate models (17) and (18) separately and report the results in columns (1) and (2). The numbers
reported in parentheses under the coefficients are t-statistics calculated using White standard errors. ***, **,
and * on the coefficients denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. We then jointly
estimate models (17) and (18) by forcing aj = bj , j = 0, , 4. The Wald statistics are reported for testing the
null hypothesis that a4 = b4 and a5 = b5. ***, **, and * on the Wald statistics denote one-sided p-value
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
PE Aft1m PE Offer PE Aft1m PE Offer Wald
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept 2.0429*** 1.2646* 1.7065***
(3.44) (1.77) (3.50)
DFBTA 0.1076 -0.0757 -0.0149
(0.95) (-0.91) (-0.13)
T -0.0089 -0.0158 -0.0105
(-0.46) (-0.67) (-0.67)
PE MKT 0.0884 0.1119 0.119
(0.58) (0.61) (0.95)
PE F 0.5058*** 0.5230*** 0.4562***
(3.63) (4.63) (4.67)
BHRet F 0.0737* 0.0273 0.1431** -0.0512 4.65**
(1.82) (1.00) (2.11) (-0.79)
BHRet A -0.1112 0.0062 -0.1401 0.0336 1.65*
(-1.59) (0.12) (-1.35) (0.34)
R2-adjusted 30.0% 35.9%
N 75 70
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Table 4: The anchoring role of the foreign share price: Insufficient adjustment.
This table reports the cross-sectional estimation results of models (19) and (20):
Prem Offer = a0 + a1DFBTA+ a2T + a4Prem MKT + b1BHRet F + b2BHRet A + ε, (19)
IR A = a0 + a1DFBTA+ a2T+ a3Prem Resid+ b1BHRet F+ b2BHRet A+ c1BHRet F×Dummy+ c2BHRet A×
Dummy + ε, (20)
where Prem Offer is calculated as the A-share offer price over the corresponding foreign share price observed five
days before the A-share listing and then minus one. IR A is the A-share underpricing level, calculated by the closing
price on the first day of the A-share listing over the offer price and then minus one. DFBTA is a dummy variable,
which takes the value of one if the firm first issues B- and then A-shares, and zero if the firm first issues H- and then
A-shares. Prem MKT refers to the market-aggregate A-share premium over B- (or H-) share prices, calculated using
all cross-listed A-H or A-B shares five-days before the A-share listing. Prem Resid is the residual from model (19).
BHRet F and BHRet A are the one-year buy-and-hold returns since the second day of the A-share listing for foreign
and A-shares, respectively. DLarge is a dummy variable, which takes the value of one if the amount of inflation-
adjusted gross proceeds collected from the A-share issuance is larger than the sample median and zero otherwise.
D∆SO is a dummy variable, which takes the value of one if the reduction of state ownership in the A-share issuance
is greater than the sample median and zero otherwise. DFee is a dummy, which takes the value of one if the flotation
cost in the A-share issuance is lower than the sample median and zero otherwise. The dummy Dσ2
θ
takes the value
of one when the turnover ratio on the first trading day is higher than the sample median and zero otherwise. T takes
the value of 1 for A-share IPOs listed in 1992, 2 for 1993, etc., and 19 for 2010. The numbers reported in parentheses
under the coefficients are t-statistics calculated using White standard errors. ***, **, and * denote significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Prem Offer IR A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept 0.5177* 1.1743*** 1.1810*** 1.0329*** 1.0750*** 1.0826*** 1.1951*** 1.0522***
(1.79) (4.15) (3.79) (3.88) (3.53) (3.76) (4.10) (3.80)
DFBTA 0.1636 -0.1896 -0.2108 -0.2301 -0.1695 -0.1840 -0.2306 -0.1594
(0.64) (-0.92) (-0.98) (-1.18) (-0.77) (-0.89) (-1.10) (-0.83)
T -0.0417** -0.0161 -0.0152 -0.0058 -0.0091 -0.0118 -0.0156 -0.0107
(-2.06) (-0.76) (-0.67) (-0.28) (-0.40) (-0.54) (-0.73) (-0.50)
Prem MKT 0.2043***
(4.10)
Prem Resid -0.1862 -0.2029* -0.2235** -0.2233* -0.1878 -0.2091*
(-1.49) (-1.81) (-2.08) (-1.79) (-1.44) (-1.78)
BHRet F 0.2606*** -0.0303 -0.0181 0.3202** 0.1455 0.2918* -0.1594 0.3452*
(2.70) (-0.41) (-0.29) (2.36) (1.06) (1.77) (-1.14) (1.87)
BHRet A -0.2253 -0.2101*** -0.2286*** -1.3272*** -0.8020* -1.3134** -0.0582 -2.1082***
(-1.57) (-2.88) (-2.86) (-3.08) (-1.90) (-2.41) (-0.59) (-3.81)
BHRet F×DLarge -0.5033** -0.7054
(-2.58) (-1.51)
BHRet A×DLarge 1.2548*** 1.2059**
(2.89) (2.43)
BHRet F×D∆SO -0.2160 0.1002
(-0.96) (0.37)
BHRet A×D∆SO 0.6472 0.2273
(1.51) (0.64)
BHRet F×DFee -0.5164** 0.0410
(-2.35) (0.10)
BHRet A×DFee 1.2414** 0.6924
(2.27) (1.18)
BHRet F×Dσ2θ 0.2764* 0.2690*
(1.85) (1.72)
BHRet A×Dσ2θ -0.5297* -0.2109
(-1.79) (-1.22)
R2-adjusted 35.0% 3.6% 6.3% 16.6% 6.6% 16.0% 7.9% 20.8%
N 75 78 75 75 75 71 74 70
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